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 In the past three decades, the American economy has experienced large 
swings in performance, over shorter and longer time periods, and has undergone major 
structural changes.  
 
 During the 1980s, we first endured a severe recession, engineered by the 
Federal Reserve Bank to fight high rates of inflation, and then recovered with a lengthy 
period of expansion and economic growth. Another and milder recession in the early 
1990s was followed by an even more robust period of expansion, often called the “Great 
Boom” or the “Roaring Nineties,” during which high productivity and income growth 
returned to the U.S. economy. But in the decade of the 2000s, which once again began 
with a mild recession, the economic picture was more mixed; a shorter period of 
recovery, during which productivity growth was high but income growth was much 
lower, was followed by the most severe economic downturn since the 1930s, which is 
commonly known as the “Great Recession”. 
 
 How did all of these economic forces play out in the U.S. labor market 
during this time period? In each economic cycle, how did trends in wages, employment 
and annual earnings reflect these economic developments? Which groups of workers 
benefited from economic growth, and which did not? Despite the periodic ups and downs 
in the economy, what long-term trends do we find in the labor market? And does the 
current severe downturn, from which our recovery will likely be painfully slow, change 
our long-term perceptions? 
 
 We will use data from the Current Population Surveys for over 30 years to 
answer these questions. The analysis will proceed in two parts. First, we consider secular 
trends in labor market outcomes over the four years that constitute labor market peaks 
during this time period: 1979, 1989, 2000 and 2007. We measure trends in hourly wages 
and annual earnings (both adjusted for inflation) as well as employment rates across these 
years, considering how these vary by gender and educational group as well as other 
demographic traits, and also how they vary over the earnings distribution. We also look at 
the changing occupation and industrial distribution of American jobs, to get more of a 
sense of the structural forces associated with the labor market outcomes we observed. 
 
 Second, we will consider peak-to-trough changes in unemployment rates, 
unemployment durations, and the percentages of the unemployed enduring lengthy spells 
of unemployment during each of the four recessions: 1979-82, 1989-92, 2000-03 and 
2007-10.1 This will indicate the extent to which the current downturn is similar to that of 
1979-82 and the other milder ones, and might also suggest what an incipient recovery 
might look like. We will then conclude with some thoughts about long-term labor market 
                                                 
1 We use annual unemployment rates to measure labor market peaks and troughs in the business cycle. 
These tend to lag behind the dates of peaks and troughs as measured by changes in real gross domestic 
product (gdp) and the beginning and end dates of recessions as determined by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER).     
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trends and policy implications to deal with both the severe downturn and secular 
developments. 
 
 Of course, many of the labor market developments we present below have 
been described in other publications, and the causes of these labor market trends have 
been much analyzed and debated by labor economists over the past few decades. But 
most of the research does not cover the past full decade, including the last few years of 
the 2000-07 cycle and the Great Recession. Our contribution is to provide an up-to-date 
summary, accessible to both economists and non-economists, of secular trends and 
cyclical swings over three decades - including the last full cycle and the Great 
Recession;2 to interpret both short-term and long-term trends and their causes in light of 
the most recent evidence; and to generate some policy prescriptions for both short-term 
and longer-term challenges based on all of this. We review the more technical literature 
by labor economists, and describe what we have learned about the causes of trends from 
that literature, but also attempt to supplement it with more recent knowledge in various 
places.   
  
The results of our analysis can be summarized as follows:  
 
 Overall labor market performance in the US has been very uneven across the past 
three decades. In the aggregate, moderate gains in wages and earnings during the 
cycle of 1979-89 were followed by more substantial gains in that of 1989-2000 
and then very modest ones during 2000-2007. 
 Despite this unevenness in overall labor market performance, certain common 
patterns appear across decades. In general, women and/or more-educated workers 
gained the most in earnings and employment while men and/or less-educated 
workers gained the least (or actually lost ground in some cases). Within these 
groups, workers at the top of the earnings distribution gained the most compared 
to those at the middle or bottom, reflecting dramatic increases in inequality. 
Along some dimensions, younger and/or minority workers as well as those in the 
Midwest region also lost ground relative to other groups.  
 Dramatic decreases in employment in manufacturing and in production and 
clerical jobs, relative to higher and lower-paying categories, further reflect 
important structural shifts in the demand for labor. But significant employment 
growth in other industries (like construction and health services) and occupations 
(like technicians) indicate a still substantial middle of the job market exists for 
those with appropriate skills. 
 Of the four recessions that occurred during these three decades, two were quite 
mild while the other two were quite severe - especially the Great Recession of 
2008 and beyond. Very large increases in unemployment rates and durations have 
occurred in the recent downturn, and were experienced primarily by less-
educated, younger and/or minority workers – who had already experienced 
relative declines in their earnings and employment over the past three decades. 
 
                                                 
2 Other authors who have provided recent summaries of both the shorter and longer-term trends include 
Autor (2010) and Mishel et al. (2010). 
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 In all, we find a labor market where progress has been very uneven over 
time and across labor market groups. Inequality has widened dramatically, and important 
structural changes have occurred. The current downturn is likely to be followed by a 
gradual recovery, during which time many of the unemployed will suffer from long-term 
“scarring.” And, even after fully recovering, labor markets might continue to show only 
modest improvements, of the kind we saw during 2000-07. 
 
 Appropriate policy responses should focus on short-term assistance to the 
unemployed as well as longer-term efforts to improve the skills of less-educated 
American workers and the quality of the jobs they get. Direct assistance to improve 
earnings among the less-educated, in the form of institutions to raise wages and cash 
assistance to the working poor (through expansions in the Earned Income Tax Credit) 
should be considered as well. 
 
II. Data and Empirical Findings 
 
We have analyzed data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly 
survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, to calculate all labor market statistics. Annual earnings figures were 
obtained from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (the “March supplement”) of 
the CPS for the preceding year. Hourly wages, employment-population ratios, as well as 
unemployment rates and durations come from the Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORGs) of 
the CPS’s monthly Earner Study. We also relied on a crosswalk from the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA), published by the University of Minnesota, 
to classify occupations consistently across the years in our study.  
 
To express annual earnings and hourly wages in real 2009 dollars, we deflated 
nominal wage and earning figures using the chain-weighted Personal Consumption 
Expenditures (PCE) version of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Deflator, constructed 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Our sample is limited to individuals between the 
ages of 16 and 69, and excludes full-time students and self-employed workers. It, 
furthermore, excludes individuals employed in the agriculture industry, as well as those 
in military or farming occupations.3  
 
To preserve the confidentiality of survey respondents, the U.S. Census Bureau 
top-codes high incomes and earnings: Values that exceed specified levels are reported at 
specified top-coded levels. To adjust annual earnings for top-coding, we used a cell mean 
series, created by Larrimore et al. (2008), that provides the mean of all income values 
above the top-code for individuals in the public use Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement of the CPS. For hourly wages, we applied a log-normal imputation to adjust 
top-coded values from the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the monthly CPS Earner Study, 
as proposed by Schmitt (2003). 
                                                 
3 To reduce the influence of extreme outliers, calculations of mean and median annual earnings 
and hourly wages are restricted to individuals who earn, in 2009 dollars, between $2 and $5,000 per hour, 
and between $1,000 and $10 million per year.    
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A. Secular Labor Market Trends Across Three Decades 
                       
           We begin by presenting data on labor market outcomes in the cyclical peak years 
across the past three decades – which include 1979, 1989, 2000 and 2007. Figure 1 
presents aggregate data on three key labor market outcomes for those years: hourly 
wages, employment/population rates, and annual earnings. Both means and medians 
appear for the wage and earnings measures. Annual earnings represent the product of 
hourly wages and total hours worked per year, where the latter represents hours worked 
per week (part-time v. full-time) and weeks worked per year; and weeks worked (out of 
50) approximates the employment rate of any group of workers, which is one of our three 
measured labor market outcomes. Therefore, annual earnings should reflect both the 
wage and employment outcomes in the labor market that we separately consider in this 
figure.         
 
           Figure 1 demonstrates consistent progress in aggregate labor market outcomes 
across the three decades considered. But the rate of progress is uneven, both over time 
and across specific outcomes. For instance, mean real hourly wages rose very modestly in 
the periods 1979-1989 and 2000-07 (by 3.8 and 6.9 percent respectively), but much more 
substantially in the period 1989-2000 (by 17.6 percent). Median wages show similar 
trends. On the other hand, employment rates rose quite strongly in the years 1979-89 and 
then they continued to increase in the period 1989-2000 before declining somewhat after 
2000. As a result of these wage and employment trends, annual earnings rose somewhat 
in the years 1979-89 (with mean and median wages rising 8 and 10 percent respectively) 
and again during the years 1989-2000 (with mean and median earnings rising 23 and 15 
percent) before flattening out after 2000 (with mean and median earnings rising only 
about 3 percent each). 
 
 It is noteworthy that, in contrast to some other recent evaluations of labor market 
trends (e.g., Mishel and Schierholz, 2010), we find at least some real wage and earnings 
growth quite consistently occurring in the U.S. labor market over the past three decades. 
To the extent that our estimates are a bit more positive than some others, this might be 
due to our use of a price deflator that rises more modestly and more accurately than other 
measures of inflation (like the Consumer Price Index) over time, as well as some other 
differences in sample composition.4  
 
 Having said that, real wage increases are very modest in the 1980s, as are wage 
and especially real earnings increases after 2000. What might account for the unevenness 
of these trends over time? Real wages declined in the aftermath of the second OPEC oil 
shock of the late 1970s, and recovered only a bit (due to quite modest productivity 
                                                 
4 A newer “research series” of the CPI for all urban workers (CPI-U-RS) has been created by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) that tries to deal with upward biases in the traditional CPI-U. But even using the 
latter (as Mishel and Schierholz have done), measured inflation rates are higher than attained using the 
chain-weighted Real GDP Deflator, as we have done. For instance, measured inflation during 1979-2007 
using the CPI-U, CPI-U-RS, and GDP deflator are 185.5, 166.1 and 150.8 percent respectively. Other 
differences between our samples and those of Mishel and Schierholz include our use of a broader age range 
and slightly different methods of dealing with sample outliers.  
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growth) afterwards. Any earnings growth observed during the 1980s is driven mostly by 
growth in employment, likely reflecting the aging of the Baby Boomer generation into 
their prime employment years. After double-digit inflation rates were brought down by a 
severe recession in the years 1981-82, a more moderate macroeconomic environment 
likely enabled the U.S. labor market to achieve a lower aggregate unemployment and 
therefore growing employment rates during that time as well (Bernanke, 2004).               
 
 In contrast, the cycle 1989-2000 reflected what has become known as the Great 
Boom or the Roaring Nineties (Krueger and Solow, 2002; Stiglitz, 2003). After a mild 
recession during 1990-91, very strong productivity growth (associated with new 
technological developments) allowed wages to rise significantly with low inflation. At 
the same time, strong consumer demand translated into strong employer demand for 
labor, which drove the unemployment rate to a 30-year low; and other policies (like 
welfare reform and expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit) also raised labor force 
participation rates among certain groups (like less-educated women), leading to 
increasing employment rates in the population (Blank, 2003). As a result, both wages and 
earnings rose substantially in this period, as did employment rates. Also, it is noteworthy 
that most labor market outcomes for this entire period are much stronger in the 1995-
2000 period than during 1989-95 one, suggesting that the real boom was shorter-lived 
than the data for the whole period suggest (Holzer and Hlavac, 2011). 
 
 But labor market outcomes over the cycle 2000-07 were much less positive than 
those that occurred earlier. While productivity growth remained very strong, much less of 
it showed up in the hourly wages of most American workers, perhaps reflecting growth in 
health care costs and other measurement issues as well as other labor market and 
institutional trends.5 At the same time, the high levels of employment achieved in the 
earlier decade were not fully sustained, as labor force activity declined a bit and 
unemployment among labor force participants also rose. Overall, the results suggest that 
employer demand for labor was weaker after 2000 than in the previous cycle, with 
employers more able to produce the goods and services demanded by consumers without 
needing to hire many more workers.6        
 
 Overall, then, labor market progress in the aggregate has been extremely uneven 
across the past three decades. But, within each period, how were any observed aggregate 
gains distributed across different demographic and earnings groups in the labor market? 
When were gains widely shared, and when not? In other words, were the gains very 
                                                 
5 Holzer and Hlavac op cit. describe how more rapid increases in health care costs after 2000 led to smaller 
wage increases associated with given levels of real compensation growth. The increases in the share of 
profits in GDP, as well as huge increases over time in executive pay and financial market bonuses, also 
appear to have contributed to the declining shares of productivity growth that result in wage growth for 
most workers. Finally, the price indices used to adjust for inflation in output have risen more slowly than 
those used for earnings, thus leading to higher measured productivity than earnings growth over time, 
though it is not clear that this mattered more after 2000 than before.      
6 Economists generally believe that productivity growth should not reduce employment rates in the long 
run, as higher productivity generates higher real incomes which, in turn, generate rising levels of demand 
for goods and services and therefore for employment over the long run. But, within a short time period 
during which consumer demand is limited, it might be possible for such a tradeoff to exist.  
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unevenly distributed across groups, resulting in greater labor market inequality, as well as 
over time? 
 
 Mean hourly wages, employment rates and annual earnings for the years 1979 and 
2007 appear in Table 1. These are presented separately by gender and/or educational 
attainment, and also by race and region. In this table, we consider the absolute 
magnitudes of employment outcomes achieved by each group, so we can measure what 
happened to gaps across these groups over the entire period; subsequently, we consider 
patterns of changes in outcomes during each of the three cycles, to more carefully review 
the progress made by different groups in those years.  
 
 The results of Table 1 indicate that labor market gaps between males and females 
narrowed between 1979 and 2007, while those between education groups increased quite 
substantially. Focusing on annual earnings, the ratio of female to male earnings rose from 
.49 percent to .69 in that period. In contrast, the ratio of earnings of high school to college 
graduates fell from .65 to .54 over the same period, and that between college graduates 
and those with advanced degrees (beyond the BA) fell from .77 to .72.7 
 
 When we consider trends by educational group and gender together, we find that 
hourly wages for less-educated men – i.e., those with a high school diploma or less – 
were essentially flat over this entire period, while their annual earnings declined slightly. 
Somewhat more positive trends in wages and earnings can be observed for college-
educated men as well as less-educated women, while the greatest advances are observed 
for highly-educated women. Indeed, college-educated women had annual earnings well 
below those of less-educated men in 1979, while by 2007 the former had earnings 
roughly 50 percent higher than the latter.     
 
 It is also noteworthy that both employment and hourly wage growth contributed 
to the observed patterns of earnings growth between males and females, with both being 
more rapid among females. Indeed, employment rates declined among men during this 
time period while rising for women. As we note more clearly below, positive correlations 
between changes in wages and employment suggest shifts in labor demand (relative to 
labor supply) across groups, which have likely contributed to the patterns of otucomes 
observed here. In this case, labor demand seems to have shifted away from less-educated 
workers, particularly men, and towards more-educated workers, especially women, over 
this entire period.   
 
 A few other findings in Table 1 are also noteworthy. The annual earnings of 
blacks relative to those of whites stayed relatively constant over time (at about .73-.75) 
but the relative wages of the former declined (from .83 to .78). Relative wages and 
earnings of Hispanics also declined while their employment rates rose quite substantially, 
likely reflecting a large influx of less-educated Hispanic immigrants into the workforce in 
this period (Borjas, 2007). And relative wages and earnings of workers in the Midwest 
region declined over time relative to those of other regions, with Midwestern workers 
                                                 
7 Alternatively, the college-high school premium rose from .54 to .85 and the premium for advanced 
degrees over college rose from .30 to .39. 
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having the highest hourly wages in 1979 but nearly the lowest by 2007. In fact, the heavy 
concentration of Midwestern workers and especially African American men in durable 
manufacturing jobs that disappeared after 1980 likely contributed to the difficulties 
experienced by both groups (Bound and Freeman, 1992; Bound and Holzer,1993), as we 
further note below. 
  
  Labor Market Changes across Groups and within Time Periods  
 
Exactly how and when all of these labor market developments occurred becomes 
clearer in the data presented below. In Table 2, we present the changes that are observed 
within the periods 1979-89, 1989-2000, and 2000-07 in hourly wages, 
employment/population ratios and annual earnings for all workers and by gender and 
educational attainment. But, even within gender or education groups, inequality might 
have risen quite substantially in the past three decades. So similar data appear in Table 3 
across the different parts of the wage and earnings distribution (i.e., the 10th, 50th, 90th and 
99th percentiles of each distribution), with hourly wage changes appearing in part a of that 
table and annual earnings changes in part b. Changes in wages and earnings appear as 
cumulative annual growth rates, while overall absolute changes are presented for 
employment/population ratios.  
 
The results for all workers in Table 2 confirm what we saw earlier in Figure 1 – 
namely, that both employment and earnings grew rapidly in the 1989-2000 cycle in the 
U.S., while employment grew rapidly in the 1979-89 and 1989-2000 periods. Rising 
employment rates generated moderate earnings growth in the first period, while declining 
employment offset modest real wage growth to generate quite low growth in annual 
earnings (.38 percent per year) in the 2000-07 period.   
 
But growth rates were very uneven across gender and education groups as well as 
over time. In general, both wages and employment grew more rapidly for women than for 
men. This is true in each of the three cycles, and within most education groups. The 
differences in employment trends are particularly noteworthy, with employment growth 
being much more positive for women than for men at all levels of education until 2000, 
and less negative since then. Indeed, employment growth for men is quite uniformly 
negative over time and across groups, while for women it is mostly positive until 2000. 
As a result, the earnings of women generally outpaced those of men in each period and 
within most education groups, with only a modest decline in employment rates after 2000 
marring an otherwise complete record of labor market progress among females over 
nearly three decades.  
 
For both men and women, growth in wages, employment and annual earnings are 
generally stronger for those with college or advanced degrees than for non-college 
workers. Real wage growth is stronger for these groups in each period, and especially the 
pre-2000 periods, when workers with higher education enjoyed dramatic wage growth 
and earnings growth. Trends in employment growth are a bit more mixed, especially 
given the strong growth of employment for less-educated women in the 1990s as a result 
of policy changes like welfare reform and EITC expansions. Still, in most periods and 
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across most groups, employment and hourly wage growth across groups are positively 
correlated, suggesting that relative labor demand shifts across both gender and education 
groups have important effects on the relative outcomes we observe. 
 
Comparing the trends for men and women at different education levels, we note 
that real wage and earnings growth was negative for non-college men in the 1979-89 
period, while earnings growth was negative for all groups of men after 2000. Thus, 
earnings trends for men, and especially the less-educated, have been mostly negative, 
except during the boom of the 1990s. In contrast, trends have been mostly positive for 
women, even among the less-educated, and they are dramatically positive for those with 
college or advanced degrees. During the 2000-07 period, hourly wage and earnings gains 
were even modest for college graduates, especially among men, but they were 
substantially stronger for men and women with advanced degrees.           
 
Similar data for hourly wages and annual earnings appear in Table 3a and 3b 
respectively for different parts of the wages and earnings distributions. At several points 
of these distributions (i.e., the 10th, 50th, 90th and 99th percentiles) we present hourly wage 
and annual earnings gains for workers over each of the three cycles, for all workers and 
separately by gender and educational category.   
 
The results of Tables 3a and 3b indicate that the median American worker 
enjoyed modest wage and earnings growth in the 1979-89 and 2000-07 periods, and more 
substantial growth in both during the 1989-2000 years. But, once again, the patterns by 
gender and/or education are much more mixed. In general, the trends experienced by the 
median workers of different gender and education groups are quite similar to what we 
saw in Table 2. Specifically, the median female college graduate experienced real wage 
and earnings growth in all periods. The median female non-college worker has mostly 
enjoyed wage and earnings growth, while college-educated men did so as well until 2000. 
But the median less-educated male workers in the U.S. mostly experienced real wage and 
earnings losses both in 1979-89 and 2000-07, with earnings growth only between 1989 
and 2000.  
 
What trends are observed at other parts of the wage/earnings distributions? Wage 
growth for the bottom 10 percent was substantially lower than for others in the 1979-89 
period, even within education and gender groups, and it has been more mixed since. But 
wage and earnings growth for those at the 90th and 99th percentiles has been positive and 
quite dramatic, especially for those with college and advanced degrees, among both men 
and women. The huge returns to the highest earners are most noteworthy during the 
1990s boom but has persisted in the 2000s for men (at the 90th percentile) and women (at 
both the 90th and 99th). Furthermore, earnings (but not wage) growth has been dramatic 
for highly educated women at the 10th percentile of earnings – likely indicating dramatic 
increases in their employment rates over time.8       
 
                                                 
8 The same value is shown in Table 3b for the men in the 99th percentiles of college graduates and those 
with advanced degrees, since in the CPS both of these values are affected by the top-coding issue described 
earlier. 
 9 
Overall, we find that employment and earnings have generally risen for more-
educated and high-earning workers, especially females, while declining most for less-
educated and low-earning workers, especially males. Despite the inconsistencies across 
particular time periods, these patterns hold up fairly consistently over a nearly 30-year 
period. Inequality has thus risen quite dramatically within as well as between education 
groups over this time period. 
 
Causes of these Trends  
 
What labor market developments might explain these trends in relative outcomes? 
A lengthy literature by labor economists now exists on the causes of these trends, though 
most of it does not cover the completion of the last full cycle in 2007 and the beginning 
of the Great Recession after that.  
 
Generally, labor economists have focused on both labor market and institutional 
forces, and there has been some debate over the extent to which observed outcomes are 
accounted for by each; more mainstream economists (e.g., Katz and Autor 1998, Autor et 
al. 2008)  have stressed the former and “revisionists” (e.g., Card and Dinardo 2002, 2007; 
Bernstein 2008) the latter.  
 
The mainstream economists mostly argue that relative labor demand – i.e., labor 
demand relative to supply - has shifted away from less-educated workers, especially 
those working in traditionally male-dominated industries (like manufacturing), and 
towards highly-skilled workers in newer (service) industries. On the demand side, they 
mostly attribute these developments to skill-biased technical change (e.g., Berman et al. 
1994; Autor et al. 1998, 2003; Levy and Murnane, 2004), in which the microcomputer 
revolution has enabled employers to replace well-paid unskilled workers doing routine 
work in production and clerical while they demand more workers performing analytical 
functions. Large increases in inequality within educational categories, including those 
with college and advanced degrees, might also be attributable to these forces (Lemieux, 
2006).  
 
Recently, some of these writers (Autor et al. 2006; Autor, 2010) have also noted a 
trend towards labor market “polarization” since the 1990s, in which the demand for low-
wage service workers performing non-routine social tasks has also increased relative to 
demand in the middle of the pay distribution. Also, the forces of trade and globalization 
earlier on were generally considered weaker contributors to the shifts in relative demand 
towards skilled workers (e.g., Freeman 1995, Feenstra and Hanson 1998); but the rise of 
foreign offshoring of services in the past decade and the growing labor market integration 
of Eastern Europe, China and India into the global economy have led some economists 
(Freeman, 2007a, Blinder 2007, Spence 2011) to view globalization as a much more 
potent force in the past decade and into the future.9  
 
And the shift of demand from routine production labor to nonroutine professional 
and service labor is widely seen as one that benefits women relative to men (Blau and 
                                                 
9 These views have been disputed by Bhagwati (2010) and Lawrence (2010), among others.  
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Kahn, 2000). Improvements in the relative earnings of women likely reflect other forces 
as well, including declining discrimination (at least partly attributable to government 
antidiscrimination policy) and the growing education and experience among female 
workers (Blau and Kahn, 2006).10 The fact that both employment and earnings have 
declined for less-educated men (Juhn, 1992) and risen for women (especially the more-
educated) reinforces the view that relative demand shifts have been an important part of 
this story.             
 
  But the shift in relative demand towards the more-educated also appears to be at 
least partly driven by lagging growth in the supply of more-educated workers (Katz and 
Murphy, 1992; Goldin and Katz, 2008). Indeed, the strong increases in the supply of 
skilled labor in the U.S. over much of the 20th century seem to have stalled in the past 
three decades, thus contributing to a shortfall in such skills relative to the growing 
demand for them. And, while the growth of skill demand appears to have decelerated in 
the past few decades (relative to the 1980s), the growth of its supply has decelerated as 
well, contributing to ongoing and even rising labor market inequality (Goldin and Katz, 
op. cit.). The fact that education and “achievement” gaps between those from higher- and 
lower-income families have grown over time also suggests declining opportunity for 
social mobility for the children of the latter over time and across generations, on top of 
rising inequality at any point in time (Duncan and Murnane, 2011).                  
 
Finally, the “revisionists” noted above continue to argue that the exact pattern and 
timing of growing inequality is not fully explained by trends in labor supply and demand. 
Instead, they emphasize institutional factors such as declining real values of minimum 
wages (Lee, 1999) and weakening labor unions (Card et al., 2003; Freeman, 2007). Also, 
the enormous growth of earnings among the very highest-paid earners, along with 
specific analyses of trends in executive compensation (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) and 
financial market bonuses (Roubini and Mihm, 2010) suggest peculiarities in the 
functioning of these specific markets that have helped dramatically raise inequality in the 
labor market overall, especially in the past decade. In many cases, these pay increases do 
not reflect high productivity or efficient market functioning, and may even impede 
performance and productivity by creating perverse incentives for excess risk-taking and 
instability.11  
 
In our view, there is some merit to all of these views, which should be viewed as 
complementary rather than mutually exclusive. There is no doubt that the powerful 
market forces of technological change and globalization have changed the ways labor 
markets function, and perhaps have contributed to a general stagnation of labor market 
outcomes since 2000. The need to improve our educational outcomes in response to these 
                                                 
10 To the extent that gender gaps in earnings continue to exist, these seem to be at least partly associated 
with losses of experience and earnings growth associated with motherhood (Waldfogel, 1998) and perhaps 
to the persistence of “glass ceiling” effects for professional and managerial women (Albrecht et al., 2003). 
11 See also Levy and Temin (2007). Financial market bonuses, in particular, might reflect market failures 
such as asymmetric information between buyers and sellers of financial products, a lack of transparency 
that leads to underpricing of risk, and moral hazard among financial managers (especially if they feel their 
banks are “too big to fail” and the risks of their actions are borne by the public), according to Roubini and 
Mihm.  
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trends, especially among lower-income Americans, remains very strong. Furthermore, the 
forces of technology and globalization have likely made labor markets more competitive, 
making it harder for traditional institutions like minimum wages and institutions to raise 
wages among the less-skilled without causing job loss.12 On the other hand, some labor 
markets remain highly imperfect, and institutions and policies continue to play important 
roles, as we argue in the Conclusion below.     
 
Demographic and Regional Breakdowns 
 
Besides gender, education, and place in the earnings distribution, what trends do 
we find in employment outcomes for workers along some other demographic or 
geographic breakdowns? In Table 4 we present changes in median hourly wages and 
annual earnings for each of the 3 time periods by age group, race, and region. Since we 
include workers aged 16-69 in our sample (but exclude full-time students and the self-
employed), it is possible that some changes in observed outcomes over time are driven by 
changes in sample composition associated with rising school enrollments among the 
young and lower retirement rates among older workers.13    
 
The results show uneven trends across all of these dimensions. Specifically:  
 The youngest cohort (aged 16-34) experienced the least wage and earnings 
growth, with modest real wage declines in 1979-89 and earnings declines 
since 2000, while older workers (ages 55-69) experienced the strongest 
gains after 1989; 
 Wage gains of blacks and Hispanics lag behind those of whites in most 
periods, while annual earnings gains are more mixed; and 
 Residents of the Midwest experienced flat or declining real earnings 
except during the 1989-2000 years, when they did relatively well. 
 
Combining these results, we see once again that young and less-educated men did 
poorly in the past three decades, but this is especially true of young African-American 
men in industrial regions. Indeed, the employment rates of young and less-educated black 
men have consistently fallen over time (Holzer et al., 2005), and are associated with 
rising rates of incarceration as well as unwed fatherhood. Faced with falling demand for 
their services, many young and less-educated black men seem to have “disconnected” 
from the labor market, and from mainstream behaviors and institutions, altogether 
(Holzer, 2009). In contrast, employment rates remain high among Hispanic and 
                                                 
12 Barry Hirsch (2008) argues that deregulation and imports made product markets more competitive in the 
past few decades, making it harder for unions to raise worker compensation levels absent offsetting 
increases in their productivity.  
13 If both part-time and full-time enrollment rates are rising, then the inclusion of part-time students and 
exclusion of full-time students both suggest lower rates of employment or hours of work for those groups 
with rising enrollment, who are likely stronger in academic ability than those who continue to work full-
time. This potentially could generate some downward trends in labor market outcomes among younger and 
older workers. On the other hand, evidence in Holzer et al. (2005) suggests these compositional effects 
account for little of the employment trends observed over time for young men. Declining rates of retirement 
can also lead to rising employment among the elderly, and even rising wages if the most able workers are 
those who are working longer.  
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especially immigrant men, who remain hopeful about future improvements for their 
children, even if their real wages now lag behind those of native-born workers (Card, 
2005).  
 
And the less-educated young women in these groups have made some progress, in 
terms of employment rates as well as real wages, as a result of both labor market and 
policy changes. Specifically, the “push” of welfare reform in the 1990s and the “pull” of 
a strong service economy plus supports for young working mothers (like child care 
subsidies and expansions of the EITC) have generated some employment gains for these 
groups, despite their low levels of skill (Blank, 2002). Education levels are also rising 
more rapidly for young women than young men in all race/gender groups in the U.S., 
which suggests relatively more positive trends for them in the future as well. On the other 
hand, the persistence of “achievement gaps” between racial and income groups in the 
U.S., along with continuing discrimination and other forms of market “mismatch,” cause 
earnings gaps between whites and minorities to persist over time as well.14         
 
Finally, the relative improvements in labor market outcomes among older workers 
are quite noteworthy as well. The long-term decline in labor market participation of older 
workers has already begun to be reversed (Munnell, 2007), and retirement ages will no 
doubt continue to rise over the coming years for a variety of reasons, especially among 
more-educated workers.15 But improvements in their relative wage and earnings over 
time also suggest that older workers who choose to work longer might find a labor 
market that is at least somewhat hospitable, with shifting demand by employers 
accommodating the rising supplies of older workers.     
 
Overall, then, the previous tables have indicated that males, less-educated, and 
younger or minority workers have lost ground relative to others in the labor market in 
recent years. Do these individual results hold up when controlling for other factors, and 
which changes are statistically significant in our data? The Appendix presents tables with 
results from regressions for both hourly and annual earnings. The regressions have been 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for the effects on mean wages and 
earnings, as well as using quantile regressions for the effects on medians. (Since the OLS 
and quantile regressions presented very similar results, only the OLS estimates are 
reported here, though the quantile results are available from the authors.)  Separate 
regressions have been estimated for each of the four peak years we’ve analyzed – 1979, 
1989, 2000 and 2007. Regressors in each equation include variables for gender, race, 
education age, and region.        
 
The regression results largely confirm what we have seen in the descriptive tables. 
While hourly wages have improved in relative terms for females, they have mostly 
                                                 
14 For evidence on recent trends in the black-white achievement gap see Magnuson and Waldfogel (2008). 
Some evidence of growing achievement gaps over time across family income groups appears in Reardon 
(2011). 
15 Rising retirement ages and work effort among the elderly likely reflect improving health and lack of 
sufficient assets to finance consumption during retirement on the “supply side” of the labor market, and 
perhaps growing demand for experienced workers or declining discrimination on the “demand side.”  
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declined for less-educated workers and minorities across these years. Gaps across age 
groups are relatively constant, but they widen in the 2000-07 period. Midwestern workers 
lose ground relative to the Northeast, especially after 2000.  
 
And, comparing results on annual earnings to those on hourly wages, we find 
similar patterns of changes but sometimes larger magnitudes of differences and changes 
over time, reflecting the generally positive correlations between levels and changes in 
wages and employment. Thus, relative annual earnings gains by women are even larger 
than in hourly wages; the earnings gaps between high school graduates and dropouts 
narrow over time (as the latter have gained more employment) but they widen between 
high school and college graduates (as well as those with advanced degrees); and they 
narrow quite substantially between younger and older workers until 2000 but widen 
somewhat after that.   
 
Outcomes by Occupation and Industry 
 
The results so far clearly suggest that demand has shifted away from less-
educated and/or male workers towards more-educated and/or female workers in the 
economy. What does this actually mean, in terms of jobs and the economic sectors into 
which workers are hired? A clearer picture of the demand side of the labor market 
emerges from data on the distributions of employment across occupations and industries. 
Table 5a and 5b present these data respectively for 1979, 1989, 2000 and 2007 at the 
broadest (1-digit) levels.     
 
The occupational data in Table 5a show rising demand in the professional and 
managerial occupations, especially during the period 1989-2000. Employment in the low-
wage service sector grows most rapidly in the period 2000-07. Employment declines 
quite dramatically for equipment operators over the entire period, with their employment 
shares dropping from over 20 percent to under 12 percent; and clerical employment drop 
as well, especially during the 1989-2000 period during which secretaries are largely 
being replaced by personal computers. 
 
All of these findings are, of course, consistent with the “polarization” hypothesis 
that has been advanced by David Autor and his various coauthors and that we have noted 
earlier.16 In that view, routine work in middle-skill or middle-paying jobs that existed as 
of 1980 have been largely replaced by computerized technology, while demand for non-
routine work at the high (professional/managerial) and low (service) ends of the labor 
market has expanded.  
 
On the other hand, other parts of the middle of the labor market have maintained 
their relative shares or even grown. For instance, technical jobs have risen as a share of 
the market, as did sales jobs in the 1979-89 period; and the share of the market accounted 
for by crafts has remained largely constant. Indeed, the middle-skill occupations 
(technical, clerical, sales, crafts and operators jobs) accounted for 59 percent of jobs in 
1979 and 49 percent in 2007; the widespread notion that the middle of the job market is 
                                                 
16 See, for instance, Autor et al. (2008) and Autor (2010). 
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completely disappearing in clearly not true. Of the jobs that remain in the middle, a 
higher share likely require some kind of postsecondary training or certification than 
before, and tasks are far less likely routine than previously; but fairly well-paying jobs 
remain in strong demand for workers in these occupations.17 
 
Similarly, Table 5b shows a large decline in employment in manufacturing, both 
durable and non-durable. Indeed, the per-year declines appear largest in the period 2000-
07, as imports from China began to grow quite dramatically.18 The steep declines in 
manufacturing (and operator) employment are also consistent with the weak labor market 
performance of the Midwest region observed in the previous table, as (durable) 
manufacturing jobs were heavily concentrated in that region historically.  
 
In contrast, strong employment growth is observed in health and other services. 
While other services contain many jobs at the high (professional) and low (service) ends 
of the skill spectrum, the health services also contain a strong contingent of middle-skill 
jobs for technicians, medical assistants and nurses below the level of registered nurse (or 
RN). Furthermore, there has been quite notable growth in construction, which also 
employs large numbers of workers in craft occupations. At least some of this growth 
clearly predates the “housing bubble” period of 2000-05, and represents the long-term 
trend to which the labor market will likely return after we recover from the Great 
Recession (during which construction employment declined precipitously).19  
 
All of these results are very consistent with data on job quality, worker skill and 
industry that appears in Holzer et al. (2011). In that analysis, longitudinal data on both 
employers and workers enable the authors to estimate separate measures of job and 
worker quality, based on firm and worker “fixed effects.”20 The results show that “good 
jobs” are not disappearing from the U.S. labor market over the longer term.. But they are 
much less likely than before to be found in the manufacturing sector, and instead they 
increasingly appear in construction, health care, retail trade and professional services. 
While these good jobs are largely available to workers without BA degrees in all but the 
last of these sectors, they require a higher skill set than in earlier years. Accordingly, a 
higher correlation between worker skills and job quality is observed in the post-2000 
period than in earlier years, implying that strong basic skills and postsecondary 
                                                 
17 See Holzer and Lerman (2007) as well as Holzer (2010).  
18 Before the current decade, most economists had attributed employment declines in manufacturing much 
more to technological advances than to growing levels of imports, since the share of American-made 
products in world output had not declined nearly as much as had employment in manufacturing industries. 
But the rise of Chinese imports of manufacturing products to the U.S. since 2000 seems to have somewhat 
changed this view (Krugman and Wells, 2009). Houseman et al. (2010) also argue that output and 
productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing has been overstated due to various statistical biases.   
19 For instance, construction employment levels reached roughly 7 million workers in 2000, before the 
housing bubble really became inflated, before falling to a level of about 5.5 million workers in 2010.   
20 Holzer and his coauthors use micro data from the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) 
data, based on unemployment insurance (UI) earnings records of states that are matched to various surveys 
by the U.S. Census Bureau. Since both workers and firms are identified in the UI data, which are 
longitudinal, separate “worker effects” and “firm effects” can be calculated for each that measure worker 
and job quality respectively.        
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certifications are more likely to be prerequisites for employment in good-paying jobs than 
they were in the past.             
        
B. Business Cycle Effects: The Great Recession v. Others   
  
           The analysis of secular trends in the labor market over the last three decades 
focuses on cyclical peaks only, and thus abstracts from the issue of recessions. To 
analyze these in greater detail – and especially the effects of the Great Recession of 
2008 and beyond - we compare labor market outcomes in cyclical peaks and troughs for 
all recessions that occurred in the last three decades.  
 
Thus, we compare labor market changes during the periods 1979-1982, 1989-
1992, 2000-2003, and 2007-2010. Figure 2a presents peak-to-trough changes in 
aggregate unemployment rates for these four downturns, while Figure 2b presents them 
for average unemployment durations only for the latter two periods (which are the only 
ones during which duration data are available from the CPS). As is well known, average 
unemployment rates increased the most during the relatively severe recessions of 1979-
82 and 2007-10 and less during the milder ones in the intervening years. While 
aggregate (monthly) unemployment rose to its highest level of nearly 11 percent in 
1982, the peak-to-trough increase was largest during the Great Recession of 2007-10.  
 
And the increase in the duration of unemployment spells in the current downturn 
has been huge. Mean durations rose by half in the 2000-03 recession (from about 14 to 
21 weeks) but they have nearly doubled in the Great Recession (from 18 to 35 weeks), 
after a secular increase in durations between 2000 and 2007. 
 
More detailed data on unemployment rates and durations, as well as how they 
have changed over time, appear in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 presents unemployment rates 
in 2007 by age, education group, region, race and gender, so as to give us a sense of 
unemployment differentials across groups that persist even in tight labor markets. Table 
7 then shows how unemployment rates, durations and the percentages of the 
unemployed with long spells (i.e., over 6 months) have changed for these groups over 
each of the last four downturns (unemployment rates) or the last two (durations and 
percentages with long-term unemployment).           
 
The results in Table 6 show high unemployment rates among blacks, less-
educated younger and Midwestern workers (relative to those of whites, the more-
educated, older workers, and those of other regions), even in good times. And Table 7 
shows that virtually all of these gaps widen during downturns, especially severe ones 
like 1979-82 and 2007-10. In particular, during the Great Recession we have seen 
unprecedented increases in unemployment rates among men, less-educated workers, 
young workers and minorities (with Hispanics as well as blacks being particularly hard 
hit this time).21  
                                                 
21 The precipitous declines in construction and manufacturing employment that have occurred since 2007 
appear to have particularly lowered employment rates among Hispanic men, more than in previous 
downturns.     
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The patterns of unemployment increases in the Great Recession are thus not 
dramatically different than those observed in earlier downturns, though their magnitudes 
are much more serious. Furthermore, the groups hard hit during the downturn are, for 
the most part, those who have suffered secular relative declines in employment and 
earnings outcomes, as observed in the analysis above. These groups include less-
educated and/or minority men, and (more recently) younger workers. Thus, the Great 
Recession exacerbates labor market difficulties that these groups have already 
experienced, certainly in the short term and perhaps in the longer term as well. 
 
Finally, we note in Table 7 that increases in unemployment durations and in the 
percentages of the unemployed suffering long spells are somewhat more evenly spread 
across these groups. Thus, to the extent that long-term unemployment will generate 
problems for workers who seek to reenter the labor market with more obsolete skills and 
who perhaps are stigmatized by their long unemployment spells, these difficulties might 
be experienced across a fairly broad group of workers.22 
 
And it is important to remember that recessions, especially very serious ones, 
generally limit earnings and its growth, even among those who are working (Hines et 
al., 2001). In particular, young workers now entering the job market are likely to be 
“scarred” by lower earnings as well as lower employment for years to come (Kahn, 
2010). And other impacts on worker health and the educational achievement of the 
children of unemployed workers will likely be negative as well (von Wachter, 2010).                
            
 Before concluding this section, we turn to a controversy that has been brewing 
recently: the extent to which the recent increase in unemployment might be structural 
rather than cyclical. In the latter case, high rates of unemployment exist primarily 
because of insufficient numbers of available jobs relative to workers; but, in the former 
case, unemployment can be exacerbated by a mismatch between the characteristics of 
unemployed workers and those sought by employers with vacant jobs. Mismatches can 
exist in terms of the skills sought by employers (whether general or sector-specific) v. 
those held by jobseekers, which become more likely if jobs permanently disappear during 
a downturn and then reappear in different sectors than before. Mismatches can also exist 
across geographic areas, if jobs are growing in areas different from where unemployed 
workers live.  
 
 One way to measure structural v. cyclical unemployment is to compare 
unemployment and job vacancy rates. Cyclical movements should show only inverse 
movements between job vacancy and unemployment rates; while structural and mismatch 
problems might be reflected in rising job vacancy rates for any given level of 
unemployment.23         
                                                 
22 See Dai and Loungani (2010) for a review of the evidence on how long-term unemployment can reduce 
reemployment rates among workers. 
23 Movements along the “Beveridge Curve” that plots aggregate unemployment and vacancy rates measure 
cyclical movements in the labor market, while outward shifts in the curve suggest growing structural or 
frictional problems that raise the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (or NAIRU). For a recent 
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 Figure 3 plots quarterly movements in aggregate job vacancy and unemployment 
rates over the entire period from 2001-2010. Mostly, the plot shows inverse movements 
between the two rates, suggesting a dominance of cyclical swings over time. And 
vacancy rates have clearly fallen during the Great Recession as unemployment rates have 
risen so dramatically, suggesting that unemployment in 2008-10 is still mostly a cyclical 
phenomenon. 
 
 At the same time, we note that the job vacancy rates observed in this downturn are 
not dramatically lower than those observed in the much shallower recession of 2000-03. 
And, since early 2009, the vacancy rate has shown a distinct rise, even while 
unemployment remains at or near double-digit levels. The higher vacancy rates are also 
consistent with some recent journalistic accounts of employers having difficulty filling 
jobs that require some fairly specific technical skills.24 
 
 While not conclusive, these results suggest that employers might be having a 
somewhat more difficult time filling their vacant jobs, perhaps due to growing mismatch 
problems.25 And, along with the rise in the numbers of the long-term unemployed, the 
data suggest that a return to unemployment rates below 5 percent might become even 
more difficult, if the slowness of employers to create new jobs becomes compounded by 
a growing difficulty they have in filling them over time. 
 
III. Conclusion and Policy Implications  
 
We have analyzed wage, employment and earnings outcomes in the U.S. labor 
market over the past three decades. We have analyzed secular trends in the labor market 
by looking at how worker outcomes have changed across the peak years of 1979, 1989, 
2000 and 2007; and we have analyzed four recessions that also occurred in these years, 
especially the Great Recession that began at the end of 2007 and from which our job 
market has yet to really emerge (as of early 2011).              
 
Our secular analysis indicates that labor market trends have been fairly uneven 
over time. During the period 1979-89, improvements in employment rates allowed 
earnings to rise quite significantly, despite modest wage (and productivity) growth; 
during 1989-2000, employment continued to rise while wage increases and productivity 
grew to raise earnings even more; while, in the period 2000-07, employment rates fell 
and wages grew very modestly despite continuing high productivity growth. 
 
In addition to the unevenness of labor market performance over time, there has 
been unevenness (but somewhat more consistency over time) in the relative performance 
of different groups in the job market. Generally, women have gained ground relative to 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussion that suggests such growing structural factors see Elsby et al. (2010). A skeptical reading of this 
argument appears in Mishel (2010).     
24 See, for instance, Uchitelle (2009) and Fletcher (2011). 
25 Another possibility is that lengthy spells of UI availability to workers during this downturn have limited 
their willingness to apply for available jobs, thereby raising job vacancy rates somewhat. See Elsby op. cit. 
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men; while wage and earnings gaps have widened between education and earnings 
groups. In the 1980s, gaps grew across the entire education and earnings spectrum; in the 
1990s and 2000s, earnings and employment rose somewhat more for the lowest groups 
relative to the middle while gains at the top decile or percentile grew the most. In some 
periods and by some measures, minorities lost ground relative to whites and younger 
workers did so relative to older ones. And residents of the Midwest region lost ground 
relative to those of the Northeast and other geographic areas. 
 
The fact that employment and wage growth tend to be somewhat positively 
correlated across groups and over time suggests that labor demand, relative to labor 
supply, has shifted in major ways across these groups. Indeed, we believe that skill-
biased technical change and globalization have contributed importantly to the trends we 
observe across education and gender groups. Our analysis of occupational and industrial 
patterns of employment shed more light on these developments. Growth in the highest 
and lowest-skill occupations exceeded that in the middle, especially for clerical workers 
and equipment operators; employment in manufacturing shrank dramatically while it 
grew in the services, especially health care.  On the other hand, the widely held views 
that the middle of the job market is completely collapsing seem overblown; substantial 
demand remains in many sectors and occupational categories for workers with at least 
some postsecondary educational credential or training.  
 
On the other hand, institutions (like unions) and policies continue to play 
important roles. Policy shifts, including antidiscrimination efforts, welfare reform, and 
the growth of work supports for low-income mothers (like the EITC and child care 
subsidies), as well as improvements in their education and experience, have all 
contributed to the improved status of women in the labor market. More negative trends 
among other groups, like less-educated African-American men, reflect market forces and 
the behavioral responses of these groups along with a general lack of similarly supportive 
policies for these low-wage workers.       
 
Finally, our analysis of cyclical downturns over the last 30 years confirmed that 
the one that began at the end of 2007 constitutes, indeed, a Great Recession. Increases in 
unemployment rates and durations, and especially the growth of long-term 
unemployment, are quite dramatic. For the most part, unemployment rates have risen the 
most for the workers who have already lost ground on a secular basis – in other words, 
males, less-educated workers, minorities and the young. And there is at least some basis 
for being concerned about structural factors impeding recovery – such as a rise in job 
vacancy rates while unemployment remains very high, and growing ranks of the long-
term unemployed for whom gaining reemployment often becomes a growing challenge, 
at least according to the experiences of other countries in recent years. 
 
What does the future hold for the U.S. labor market, in both the short and longer 
terms? And what policies are suggested by this analysis, to help those workers who have 
lost the most ground in the downturn and over the longer period? 
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Most economists expect a slow recovery from the current downturn, which is 
often the case after a financial “bubble” bursts.  Unemployment remained above 9% for 
all of 2010 and will likely remain high for the next several years, declining only modestly 
each year.26 For example, in January 2011, the Congressional budget office forecast that 
unemployment would still be above 5% for most of 2015. If anything, the slower than 
anticipated growth in output and employment we’ve had since then suggests that these 
projections might be too optimistic. Previous research shows that certain groups of 
workers – especially the young who enter the labor market during such inauspicious 
times and permanent job losers who suffer long-term unemployment – are likely to be 
“scarred” by their experiences and to suffer from lower earnings for many years, even 
after the labor market recovers. 
 
And, when such recovery occurs, to what kind of labor market will be return? Are 
we more likely to revert to the economy of the 1990s, with its widely shared employment 
and earnings growth, or the 2000s, when the growth in demand for many kinds of labor 
was more limited, and when employment and earnings growth were limited and uneven 
as well?  
 
We have no way to forecast future trends; but, unfortunately, the 1990s now look 
more like the anomalous period, while the period 2000-07 more likely reflects the secular 
trends to which we will return. For instance, we have no reason to believe that the forces 
apparently generating limited labor demand for U.S. workers in the last decade – 
including technological changes and growing globalization – will have very different 
effects in the coming decade.27 Productivity growth will hopefully remain strong, though 
that is not certain; and, even if it does, much of it may not show up in many workers’ 
paychecks.  
 
Other drains on earnings growth, such as rising health care costs, show little sign 
of abatement, while the future trends in executive and financial manager compensation 
(which shifted so much compensation to the top 10 and 1 percent of workers) remain 
quite unclear. Also, much of the employment growth that we observed in the past few 
decades was concentrated in sectors such as health care, financial services and 
construction, and future employment growth there is now more uncertain; and a decline 
over time in business startups in the U.S. might continue and limit new hiring and 
employment growth in the U.S. more broadly (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011; Spence, 
2011).    
 
With such an uncertain forecast for both the near-term and longer-term, how 
should labor market policy respond? At a minimum, expanded safety net provisions 
(including Unemployment Insurance, Food Stamps and Medicaid) should remain in 
effect while the aggregate unemployment rate remains so high. Fears that such extensions 
                                                 
26 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) for a discussion of how recessions brought on by financial market 
turmoil generates persistent unemployment over time. Forecasts of unemployment rates over the next 
decade have been generated by the Congressional Budget Office (2010). 
27 See Freeman (2007a) and Blinder (2007) for pessimistic accounts of how global forces will affect 
workers in the coming decade. 
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will discourage job search and reemployment might make sense in an economy with tight 
labor markets and significant job availability, but not in a market with so much slack.28  
 
Reemployment services that better help match these workers to existing jobs and 
provide them with necessary assistance with job search or skills training should be 
considered as well, on top of other efforts to spur job creation in the short term. The 
latter, which could include payroll tax cuts targeted towards employers who expand their 
payrolls, as well as direct government expenditures on job creation (e.g., for 
infrastructure or state and local employees), could also include public service 
employment programs targeted towards disadvantaged groups with the highest 
unemployment rates. 
 
Over the longer term, and even in a generally weak labor market, there remains a 
strong case for improving the educational outcomes of workers. These outcomes should 
include certificates and degrees at 2-year schools (i.e., community and technical colleges) 
as well as those at 4-year colleges and universities. Though earnings growth in the 2000s 
was modest even for college graduates, the enormous and sometimes growing gaps in 
earnings between more and less-educated workers suggest great scope for improving 
earnings and for dampening inequality if more of them could have such credentials. And 
this means not only improving the access of many Americans to the full range of 
colleges, but also raising rates of completion of degrees and certificates there.29 
 
Of course, what happens in the labor markets depends not only on the quality of 
workers and their skills, but also on the quality of jobs created by employers. As we 
noted earlier, and contrary to many popular accounts, the U.S. labor market continues to 
create many millions of high-quality jobs (Holzer et al. 2011); but, in contrast to jobs in 
previous generations, these jobs increasingly require workers who have good basic skills 
and educational credentials.30  
 
From a policy point of view, it is therefore important that the skills obtained by 
workers match the areas of the labor market where demand is strongest, and that we give 
them the credentials sought by employers in well-paying jobs. Potential workers need 
more career guidance from workforce development systems on where labor market 
demand is strong, and employers need to be engaged in the process of generating workers 
skills to fill their available jobs, through “sectoral” training programs, apprenticeships, 
and other kinds of incumbent worker training.31 Even high-quality career and technical 
                                                 
28 Recent evidence suggesting that Unemployment Insurance only modestly affects job search and 
unemployment rates can be found in Card et al. (2007). 
29 See Goldin and Katz op. cit. for a discussion of how rising rates of college completion might help 
dampen inequality, and Haskins et al. (2009) for a discussion of how college completion rates can be 
improved, especially among lower-to-middle income Americans. 
30 In this study, the quality of a job is distinguished from that of workers by whether or not the firm pays a 
wage premium above what the worker usually obtains in others jobs in the labor market. With longitudinal 
earnings data over many years for both workers and firms, the authors were able to estimate “worker 
effects” and “firm effects” where the latter reflect job quality. 
31 See Furchtgott-Roth et al. (2010) for a discussion of how improvements in the attainment of degrees and 
certificates, especially at community colleges, can improve economic mobility for disadvantaged 
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education in high schools, such as the Career Academies (which have provided strong 
labor market benefits to at-risk young men), should be strengthened as well.32      
 
Also, we need to encourage the creation of more good-paying jobs by employers, 
as well as the skills of workers to fill them. Historically, we have used legal and 
institutional methods like higher minimum wages and collective bargaining to do so. 
While we continue to believe these institutions play important roles in the labor market, 
we also believe that their ability to raise private sector wages is considerably lower than 
in earlier eras.33 Thus, efforts to induce employers to create more good-paying jobs might 
have to rely more on “carrots,” such as subsidies and technical assistance related to 
broader economic development efforts, and less on “sticks” than in the past.34   
 
And, for those workers whose education and skills remain limited and who face 
only the prospects of employment at low wages, other forms of income supplementation 
may need to be considered. For instance, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) from the 
federal government currently enhances the earnings of low-income parents with two of 
more children by as much as 40 percent; but childless adults and non-custodial parents 
paying child support benefit little from the current system. These limitations mean that 
many less-educated (and especially minority) men, who have fared so badly in the labor 
market in recent years, gain little from an important program that provides support to so 
many low-income mothers. Accordingly, expanding federal EITC eligibility, and 
enhancing payments to these currently underserved groups, constitutes one way in which 
earnings can be supplemented and inequality reduced even in a labor market generating 
flat earnings growth and enormous gaps between the highest and lowest paid workers.35    
 
Finally, since the enormous increases in pay at the very top of the earnings 
distribution do not seem to always reflect productivity or efficient markets – indeed, they 
often reflect the opposite – it may be time to consider other measures to limit them. These 
might include more stringent regulations on compensation in the financial markets as 
well as changes in corporate governance practices that might limit exorbitant levels of 
executive pay. 
       
                                                                                                                                                 
Americans, and also on the need to make sure that such certifications are linked to trends in labor market 
demand. See Maguire et al. (2010) for recent evidence on sectoral training programs and Kemple (2008) 
for evidence on the success of Career Academies. Lerman (2007) also discusses the potential of career 
education to improve labor market outcomes for disadvantaged youth.   
32 See Lerman (2007) and Kemple (2008). 
33 The fractions of private sector workers covered either by federal minimum wages or collective 
bargaining are both very low; for the latter, less than 7 percent of workers are now covered, while the 
fraction covered by the former depends on the statutory minimum relative to the median market wage at 
any time but is always below 10 and often below 5 percent. In addition, when labor and product markets 
become more competitive, as they no doubt have in recent decades, the ability of these instituions to raise 
wages without creating job losses diminishes as well, unless the higher wages are offset by higher worker 
productivity.      
34 See Holzer et al. (2011) for a review of such efforts, including tax credits for incumbent worker training, 
technical assistance for firms trying to improve worker promotion possibilities, and the like.  
35 See Edelman et al. (2009) for a discussion of how the Earned Income Tax Credit might be expanded to 
improve coverage of low-income childless adults and especially non-custodial fathers paying child support. 
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Median Annual Earnings, 1979-2007 
Source: CPS, Annual Social and 
               Economic Supplement 
Table 1
Mean Hourly Wages, Employment-Population Ratios and Mean Annual Earnings
By Gender, Education, Race and Region
1979-2007
Mean Hourly Wages Employment/Population Ratio Mean Annual Earnings
Category 1979 2007 1979 2007 1979 2007
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------( 2010 Dollars )----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  ----------------- ( 2010 Dollars )---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All $ 16.57 $ 21.63 0.65 0.69 $ 33,232 $ 45,357
By Gender:
Men $ 19.60 $ 24.01 0.79 0.75 $ 43,062 $ 53,404
Women 12.72 19.08 0.53 0.64 20,894 36,767
By Education:
Less than High School $ 13.42 $ 12.51 0.48 0.47 $ 24,503 $ 22,924
High School 15.26 16.67 0.66 0.66 29,704 32,627
Some College 16.78 19.34 0.74 0.73 33,460 39,774
College 21.50 28.33 0.78 0.79 45,678 60,302
Advanced Degree 25.42 35.82 0.87 0.81 59,180 83,709
By Education and Gender:
High School or Less:        - Men $ 17.33 $ 17.51 0.74 0.68 $ 36,386 $ 35,200
- Women 11.36 13.65 0.47 0.54 18,056 24,726
Bachelor's Degree or More:        - Men $ 25.99 $ 34.91 0.91 0.85 $ 61,938 $ 84,104
- Women 17.37 26.69 0.68 0.75 30,616 52,847
By Race:
White $ 17.05 $ 23.13 0.66 0.71 $ 34,632 $ 49,267
Black 14.07 17.98 0.60 0.65 25,442 36,767
Hispanic 13.89 16.53 0.60 0.67 26,404 32,008
By Region:
Northeast $ 16.72 $ 23.57 0.64 0.71 $ 34,051 $ 49,343
Midwest 16.82 20.75 0.66 0.72 34,319 43,543
South 15.43 20.42 0.63 0.68 30,724 43,159
West 17.96 22.87 0.65 0.68 34,877 47,422
Notes: The sample is restricted to ages 16-69. It excludes agriculture and the military. It also excludes full-time students
and self-employed individuals. Individuals with with hourly wages below $2 or above $5,000, as well as those
with annual earnings below $1,000 or above $10 million, are not included.
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Mean Unemployment Durations, 2000-2010 
Source: CPS, Outgoing Rotation Groups 
Table 2
Changes in Mean Hourly Wages, Employment-Population Ratios and Mean Annual Earnings
By Gender and Education
1979-1989, 1989-2000, 2000-2007
Mean Hourly Wages Employment/Population Ratio Mean Annual Earnings
Category 1979-1989 1989-2000 2000-2007 1979-1989 1989-2000 2000-2007 1979-1989 1989-2000 2000-2007
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------( Cumulative Annual Growth Rate )---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------- ( Absolute Change During Time Period ) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------( Cumulative Annual Growth Rate ) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All 0.37 % 1.49 % 0.96 % 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.76 % 1.92 % 0.38 %
Men by Education:
Less than High School -1.23 % -0.26 % 0.39 % -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -1.47 % 0.20 % -0.59 %
High School -0.83 0.75 0.17 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.57 0.47 -0.63
Some College -0.12 0.88 0.15 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.29 1.19 -0.84
College 0.32 1.51 0.64 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.76 1.90 -0.63
Advanced Degree 1.12 1.68 1.29 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.87 3.12 -0.21
Women by Education:
Less than High School -0.64 % 0.52 % 0.72 % 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.49 % 0.71 % 0.58 %
High School 0.18 1.10 0.65 0.05 0.02 -0.02 1.05 1.34 0.67
Some College 1.10 1.05 0.67 0.07 0.02 -0.02 1.95 1.55 0.76
College 1.53 1.90 0.76 0.09 0.00 -0.01 2.56 2.03 0.57
Advanced Degree 1.58 1.76 0.87 0.04 0.00 -0.02 1.89 2.57 0.85
Notes: The sample is restricted to ages 16-69. It excludes agriculture and the military. It also excludes full-time students and self-employed individuals.
Individuals with with hourly wages below $2 or above $5,000, as well as those with annual earnings below $1,000 or above $10 million, are not included.
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Unemployment Rate Vacancy Rate Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Table 3b
Changes in Annual Earnings











Category 1979-1989 1989-2000 2000-2007 1979-1989 1989-2000 2000-2007 1979-1989 1989-2000 2000-2007 1979-1989 1989-2000 2000-2007
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------( Cumulative Annual Growth Rate )---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- ( Cumulative Annual Growth Rate ) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ( Cumulative Annual Growth Rate ) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ( Cumulative Annual Growth Rate ) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All 2.92 % 3.54 % 0.88 % 0.95 % 1.30 % 0.45 % 0.66 % 1.62 % 0.60 % 0.83 % 5.36 % -2.68 %
Men by Education:
Less than High School -0.97 % 3.08 % 0.34 % -1.88 % 0.08 % -0.64 % -1.25 % -0.22 % -0.63 % -1.46 % 1.23 % 0.54 %
High School -1.71 1.07 -1.36 -1.01 0.22 -1.32 -0.24 0.67 -0.18 0.41 0.85 0.29
Some College 0.86 2.35 -2.29 0.17 0.67 -0.77 0.28 1.16 -0.28 1.08 2.09 -2.00
College -0.50 1.30 -0.28 0.43 1.25 -0.95 0.54 1.44 0.01 3.27 4.84 0.91
Advanced Degree -0.52 2.54 0.88 1.04 2.04 -0.27 -0.21 3.09 -0.14 3.27 4.84 0.91
Women by Education:
Less than High School 2.99 % 2.71 % 4.15 % 0.45 % 1.90 % -0.11 % 0.52 % 0.59 % 0.29 % 2.02 % -0.26 % 1.47 %
High School 3.46 3.50 1.55 1.05 1.09 0.21 1.62 1.18 0.13 2.02 1.15 2.22
Some College 6.03 3.98 1.61 2.43 1.42 0.10 2.02 1.30 0.55 2.02 1.66 1.53
College 8.11 2.99 -0.81 2.52 1.45 0.51 2.52 2.21 0.65 2.52 4.28 -0.22
Advanced Degree 1.70 6.12 0.29 1.49 1.78 0.18 1.80 2.47 0.88 0.66 9.24 1.07
Notes: The sample is restricted to ages 16-69. It excludes agriculture and the military. It also excludes full-time students and self-employed individuals.
Source: Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement.
Table 4
Changes in Median Hourly Wages and Median Annual Earnings
By Age, Race and Region
1979-1989, 1989-2000, 2000-2007
Median Hourly Wages Median Annual Earnings
Category 1979-1989 1989-2000 2000-2007 1979-1989 1989-2000 2000-2007
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------( Cumulative Annual Growth Rate )---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------- ( Cumulative Annual Growth Rate )---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
By Age Group:
16-34 -0.14 % 0.72 % 0.21 % 0.39 % 0.88 % -0.16 %
35-54 0.27 0.92 0.70 0.65 0.97 0.22
55-69 -0.01 1.33 1.48 0.23 1.42 1.40
By Race:
White 0.44 % 1.34 % 0.76 % 0.90 % 1.77 % 0.29 %
Black -0.01 1.23 0.63 1.36 1.50 0.50
Hispanic -0.42 0.70 0.84 -0.17 1.06 1.03
By Census Region:
Northwest 1.14 % 0.89 % 0.69 % 1.52 % 1.30 % -0.11 %
Midwest -0.35 1.44 0.09 -0.01 1.64 -0.41
South 0.15 1.41 0.73 0.75 1.54 0.39
West 0.24 0.72 0.76 0.70 1.07 0.98
Notes: The sample is restricted to ages 16-69. It excludes agriculture and the military.
 It also excludes full-time students and self-employed individuals.
Source: Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Groups and Annual Social and Economic Supplement.
Table 5a
Distribution of Employment (%)
By Occupation
1979, 1989, 2000, 2007
Distribution of Employment
Occupation Group 1979 1989 2000 2007
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------( Percent )---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Professional 11.78 % 13.12 % 16.03 % 17.57 %
Managerial 10.50 12.09 14.34 13.37
Technical 2.83 3.50 3.66 3.92
Clerical 18.49 17.31 14.97 15.00
Sales 7.65 10.32 10.54 10.18
Crafts 8.41 8.37 7.96 8.14
Operators 21.27 16.19 13.56 11.85
Laborers 4.51 4.34 4.24 3.55
Service 12.47 13.01 13.09 14.75
Notes: The sample is restricted to ages 16-69, and excludes full-time students and
self-employed individuals.
Source: Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Groups.
Table 5b
Distribution of Employment (%)
By Industry
1979, 1989, 2000, 2007
Distribution of Employment
Occupation Group 1979 1989 2000 2007
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------( Percent )---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mining 0.99 % 0.67 % 0.44 % 0.57 %
Construction 5.79 5.84 6.20 7.22
Manufacturing, Non-durable 11.70 9.84 7.57 5.30
Manufacturing, Durable 14.17 11.06 9.09 7.14
Transportation, Communications and Utilities 7.25 7.67 7.90 8.24
Wholesale Trade 3.84 3.93 4.10 3.16
Retail Trade 14.79 15.03 15.02 10.82
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 6.09 6.98 6.54 6.80
Health Services 7.51 8.32 9.34 10.90
Educational Services 8.68 8.39 8.92 9.67
Other Services 11.20 15.03 18.14 23.96
Public Administration 6.06 5.58 5.14 5.39
Notes: The sample is restricted to ages 16-69, and excludes full-time students and
self-employed individuals.
Source: Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Groups.
Table 6
Unemployment Measures
By Gender, Education, Race and Census Region
2007
Mean Duration
Unemployment Rate of Unemployment
Category 2007 2007
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------( Percent )---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- ( Weeks )---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All 4.57 % 18.0
By Gender:
Men 4.69 % 18.9
Women 4.44 17.1
By Age:




Less than High School 9.98 % 18.1
High School 5.56 18.2
Some College 4.30 17.3
College 2.43 19.1
Advanced Degree 2.03 17.9
By Race:








Notes: The sample is restricted to ages 16-69. It excludes 
agriculture and the military. It also excludes full-time
students and self-employed individuals.
Source: Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Groups.
Table 7
Peak-to-Trough Change in Unemployment Measures
By Gender, Education, Demographic Group and Census Region
1979-1982, 1989-1992, 2000-2003, 2007-2010
Unemployment Duration
Unemployment Rate Mean Duration of Unemployment  Over 6 Months
Category 1979-1982 1989-1992 2000-2003 2007-2010 2000-2003 2007-2010 2000-2003 2007-2010
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------( Percentage Points )---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------- ( Weeks ) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- ( % of Unemployed Individuals ) ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All 4.16 % 2.27 % 2.16 % 5.12 % 7.3 17.0 12.36 % 26.89 %
By Gender:
Men 5.34 % 2.91 % 2.65 % 6.00 % 7.4 16.6 13.69 % 26.85 %
Women 2.73 1.57 1.64 4.18 6.9 17.3 10.65 26.77
By Education:
High School or Less 5.69 % 3.03 % 2.50 % 7.29 % 6.0 17.1 10.62 % 26.69 %
Bachelor's Degree or More 1.03 1.01 1.65 2.87 9.0 15.3 14.46 25.41
By Age Group:
16-34 5.20 % 2.56 % 2.69 % 6.18 % 5.8 14.3 9.63 % 22.70 %
35-54 3.26 2.18 1.92 4.65 8.4 18.3 14.51 29.22
55-69 2.51 2.38 1.90 4.36 7.7 20.4 14.02 32.00
By Race:
White 3.65 % 2.10 % 1.89 % 4.31 % 8.1 17.6 13.56 % 28.08 %
Black 6.79 2.68 3.22 7.76 7.9 15.8 14.30 24.23
Hispanic 5.78 2.85 1.87 6.72 2.4 17.4 3.71 28.13
By Region:
Northeast 2.51 % 3.79 % 2.26 % 4.56 % 5.7 16.6 11.92 % 26.97 %
Midwest 6.23 1.27 2.21 4.49 8.2 15.8 13.47 23.83
South 3.76 1.69 2.15 5.15 6.8 16.9 11.04 27.00
West 4.02 2.88 2.04 6.17 8.1 18.9 13.36 30.09
Notes: The sample is restricted to ages 16-69. It excludes agriculture and the military. It also excludes full-time students and self-employed individuals.
Source: Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Groups.
